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ON 11 MAY 1995, THE PANEL OF JUDGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CATALONIA PRIZE AGREED 
UNANIMOUSLY TO AWARD THE VI1 INTERNATIONAL CATALONIA PRIZE TO VÁCLAV HAVEL, WRITER 
AND PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND RICHARD VON WEIZSACKER, FORMER MAYOR OF 
BERLIN AND FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC. 
THE FACT THAT THE PRIZE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO TWO IMPORTANT FIGURES IN THE 
POLITICAL FIELD UNDERLINES EVEN MORE BOLDLY THE EXEMPLARY NATURE OF THEIR POLITICAL 
SERVICE AND DETERMINATION. 
AS REGARDS EACH OF THE PRIZE-WINNERS, THE JUDGES CONSIDER: 
FIRST: THAT VÁCLAV HAVEL'S WORK OF LITERATURE AND NON-FICTION REFLECTS, OVER AND ABOVE 
ITS INTRINSIC VALUE, A HUMANISTIC CONTENT AND A KEY TO FREEDOM WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO 
ALL HUMAN BEINGS AND TO THOSE SOCIETIES THAT ASPIRE TO DIGNITY AND DEMOCRACY. THE WORK 
OF VÁCLAV HAVEL HAS BEEN DECISIVE IN THE COMMON STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSION TO 
WHICH HIS COUNTRY WAS SUBJECTED FOR DECADES AND HAS FORMED A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE 
AUTHOR'S FUNCTION IN HIS NEW ROLE AS THE EXEMPLARY PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. 
THE JUDGES DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT A LITERARY WORK IN A MINORITY LANGUAGE, 
CZECH, SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED SUCH ACCLAIM AMONGST THE GREAT LANGUAGES, DOUBTLESS A 
RESULT OF ITS CONTENT, BUT ALSO OF ITS AUTHOR'S MORAL METTLE. 
SECOND: THE RICHNESS AND NATURALNESS WHICH IN THE FIELDS OF HUMANISM, DIGNITY, PEACE 
AND EQUALITY HAVE MARKED THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD VON WEIZSACKER FOR TEN 
YEARS MAKE HIM ONE OF EUROPE'S LEADING DESIGNERS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRAXIS IN 
THEIR NOBLEST SENSE, REJECTING BOTH RACISM AND TOTALITARIANISM, AS WELL AS SOCIAL 
INJUSTICE. RICHARD VON WEIZSACKER HAS, THROUGH CONSTANT ETHICAL AFFIRMATION, RAISED 
THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY TO A TRULY EMBLEMATIC PRESIDENCY FOR CITIZENS OF GOOD WILL ALL 
OVER THE WORLD. 
CATALONIA OFFERS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH MADE BY THE TWO AWARD WINNERS AT THE PALACE 
OF THE GENERALITAT ON RECEIVING THE PRIZE. 
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VACLAV HAVEL 
Your Roya1 Highness, 
President Pujol, 
President von Weizsacker, 
Mr Porcel, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
r he fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War led me to reflect, once again, on 
the turbulent modern history of my 
country. And once again, 1 realise that, 
in fact, the central theme of this history 
is one which is always present, and one 
which has always greatly interested me: 
the relationship between morality and 
politics. When President Pujol asked 
me to say a few words on this august 
occasion, it immediately came to me 
that 1 could reflect on this relationship 
from the point of view of the recent his- 
tory of my country. 
There have been severa1 key moments in 
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this history when the leaders of our 
country were confronted with the same 
overwhelrning dilemma: to harm the pop- 
ulation by submitting to a dictatorship, 
or to harm it by not submitting to this 
dictator. 
Invariably, they chose the first alterna- 
tive, and 1 always thought that this was a 
fatal error. 1 still think so today. However, 
in contrast to the time when 1 was an 
independent observer of history -some- 
one who had never expenenced how dif- 
ficult it is to take a decision when one 
bears the burden of a political post and 
direct responsibility for the destiny of 
one's fellow citizens and their children-, 
today 1 feel a greater understanding for 
the weight that bore on the people who 
had to take those historic decisions. 1 
confess that lately 1 have tried repeatedly 
to put myself in their shoes, to imagine 
what 1 would have done in their place. 
Would 1 have been capable of deciding 
so easily in favour of the altemative that 
1 now consider to be the correct one? 
Would it be as easy for me to take that 
decision now as it was before 1 gained 
first-hand experience in a political post? 
The first terrible dilemma was faced by 
Eduard Benes, the president of Czechos- 
lovakia at the time of the Munich Pact. 
He was well aware that the Pact repre- 
sented the aggression of a madman sanc- 
tioned by the approval of our allies of the 
time, who not only betrayed the agree- 
ments that they had signed, but also the 
values they professed. Benes knew that, 
from the point of view of national honour 
and the salvation of the moral integrity 
of our national community, the correct 
response would have been to refuse to 
yield before the dictatorship and to opt 
for the defence of the country. At the 
same time, he also knew that this deci- 
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sion would have meant the death of thou- 
sands of people; the destruction of the 
country, and probably its rapid military 
defeat by a much stronger rival. He knew 
that such a decision would undoubtedly 
have met with the incomprehension and 
opposition of the democratic world, 
which would have accused him of being 
a destroyer of peace, a provocative and 
reckless gambler who stupidly hoped to 
drag other nations into an absolutely un- 
necessary war. 
He opted for capitulation without a strug- 
gle because he felt that this was more 
responsible than risking a subsequent 
capitulation which would have entailed 
irnrnense sacrifice. 
The same man found himself faced with 
a similar situation in February 1948, 
when he could have opposed the leaders 
of the Communist coup, who were sup- 
ported by the powerful Soviet Union and 
a section of the population, thereby run- 
ning the risk of a bloodbath that would 
have only served to forestal1 an inevita- 
ble Communist victory. The alternative 
was to withdraw without resistance and 
voluntarily open the door to the many 
long years of totalitarian government. 
And Benes -an old, ill and disillusioned 
man- once again opted for capitulation. 
The political representatives of Czechos- 
lovakia capitulated for the third time af- 
ter the Soviet invasion of our country in 
1968, when they were al1 taken to the 
Soviet Union where, after severa1 days of 
humiliations and threats, they al1 -with 
just one exception- signed the Moscow 
Protocols, which legalized the occupa- 
tion of Czechoslovakia and constituted 
the first decisive step towards the shame- 
lessly denominated "normalization" 
which followed. 
Drawing comparisons between different 
historical situations is obviously risky. 
This is also true for the cases 1 have just 
mentioned, where different people with 
different experiences, in different inter- 
national and national conditions had to 
take decisions on very different matters. 
Volumes of words have been written 
about each of these three dilemmas -eye- 
witness accounts, books of memoirs and 
historical analyses- and anyone who has 
taken an interest in these three events 
knows very well that it would be gratu- 
itous to attempt to equate these three 
dark moments of our modern history in 
any way. 
However, some general analogies that 
can be found between them cannot be ig- 
nored: 
1) The people who took these decisions 
obviously did not know what we know 
today; that is, they did not know what the 
consequences of their actions would be; 
and in general, they did not know what 
course history would take in the wake of 
their decisions. In this situation they 
could only rely on their own judgment 
and suppositions. Fundamentally, every- 
thing depended on the depth of their un- 
derstanding of the particular situation 
and on their own imagination in fore- 
seeing the consequences of their deci- 
sions, whatever these might be. They 
were well aware that they had to choose 
between two evils, and they al1 tried to 
weigh up the arguments to decide which 
would be the lesser of the two evils. 
2) In each of these three dilemmas the 
people who were trapped could opt for a 
"more ethical" solution, but one that en- 
tailed the risk of inestimable loss of life 
and incalculable human suffering; or 
they could opt for a "more realist" deci- 
sion, which was unlikely to cause such 
great direct losses. They were confronted 
by two opposing dimensions of political 
responsibility: on the one hand, respon- 
sibility for the moral integrity of society, 
and on the other, responsibility for hu- 
man lives. This must be a terrible dilem- 
ma, and one that cannot be judged easily 
by anyone who has never faced such a 
situation. 
3) None of us knows, nor will we ever 
know, what would have happened if the 
people who took these three decisions 
had opted for the altemative course of ac- 
tion. History is characterized by the phe- 
nomenon which scientists call "singu- 
larity": there is only one succession of 
events; there are no altematives that we 
can compare, there is no conditional 
"what if'. For this reason, it is necessary 
to use great caution and objectivity in 
evaluating decisions which have never 
been taken and to avoid overly simplis- 
tic judgements. 
4) These three decisions had very simi- 
lar consequences: a profound upheaval of 
society and its long-term demoralization. 
It might even be said that these three 
events are connected by a fine -almost 
invisible- thread of causal relation or 
continuity: without the trauma of Mu- 
nich, the conditions which were relative- 
ly favourable to the Communist offen- 
sive -to which the democrats finally 
succumbed- would probably not have 
existed after the war; and if the victory 
of the Communists in 1948 had not been 
so easy, it is likely that the reformist 
Communists of 1968 would have put up 
more of a fight. 1 do not think that the 
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Czechs, or rather the Czechs and the Slo- 
vaks, are morally any worse than any 
other nation. 1 do feel, however, that the 
decades since the signing of the Munich 
Pact in 1938 have marked our country 
with a very specific moral frustration, 
and that the three political decisions 1 am 
talking about here had a decisive in- 
fluence on this frustration, on its origin, 
its development and its intensification. 
Our democracy, or rather our desire for 
democracy, was given up without a fight 
on three occasions, a fact that has been 
profoundly imprinted upon the con- 
sciousness of our society, leaving behind 
a sinister stigma. 1 could quote hundreds 
of concrete examples to support this as- 
sertion, but this is not my purpose here 
today. 
My aim here is to show how difficult it 
is to counterpose politics and morals. 1s 
it not tme that the consequences of what 
we might call "less moral" decisions 
were, from a political point of view, pro- 
foundly pemicious? Did the moral trau- 
mas caused by these decisions not have 
serious political consequences in the long 
term? We do not know what the conse- 
quences of the altemative decisions -the 
so-called "more moral" alternatives- 
would have been. We can, however, eas- 
ily imagine that they would not neces- 
sarily have had such pernicious, pro- 
found, lasting and fatal consequences. It 
is probable that, in the short term, there 
would have been greater loss of human 
life and more material damage, and that 
more people would have had to endure 
physical suffering. However, one may 
ask: would these alternatives not have 
prevented other losses -1ess visible, but 
deeper and more prolonged- that ended 
up wreaking havoc on the moral integrity 
of our national cornrnunity? It is very dif- 
ficult to weigh up the different types of 
losses and judge how many human lives 
it is worth sacrificing -and how many it 
is not worth sacrificing- for the long- 
term health of society and its prolonged 
immunity against new evils. Whatever 
the answer may be, one thing is clear: 
morality and immorality have direct po- 
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litical consequences and, vice versa, po- 
litical decisions have direct moral con- 
sequences. So 1 believe that it is foolish 
LIBER FEUDORUM MAIOR. to separate politics from morality and to 
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unconnected things. To state such a 
thing, or, with even greater reason, to put 
it into practice, is -paradoxically- not 
only profoundly immoral but also, at the 
same time, politically erroneous. 
Morality is omnipresent, as is politics; 
and politics that distances itself from 
morals is simply bad politics. 
Nevertheless, 1 have still not answered 
the question as to what 1 would have 
done had 1 found myself in the place of 
my predecessors, faced with the dilem- 
mas that they were confronted with. 
1 confess that 1 do not know. 1 can only 
say 1 believe that 1 would probably not 
have taken the decision they did. 1 do not 
rule out, however, that my present affir- 
mation is influenced by the fact that 1 
know what they could not have known: 
that is, where their decisions would lead. 
So it seems to me more appropriate to 
raise another question: what would 1 do 
today if 1 were confronted with a similar 
dilemma, without knowing, without 
being able to know -just as they did not 
know- the consequences my decision 
would have? 
1 think that 1 would try to weigh up ob- 
jectively al1 the possible circumstances 
surrounding my decision, that 1 would 
seek the advice of many people who had 
my complete confidence, 1 would make 
a global analysis of the situation, and 
would try to calculate rationally the var- 
ious possible consequences of my ac- 
tions. If after doing al1 of this 1 still did 
not know what 1 should do, then most 
probably 1 would recur to the final arbi- 
ter, one which, while perhaps not totally 
reliable, has more than once been shown 
to be the surest guide, namely my con- 
science, my ethical intuition, that which 
1 bear within -at least, that is how 1 feel 
about it-, that something which is 
greater than me as a person. 
We al1 know what are called pangs of 
conscience. The strange and unpleasant 
sensation of having betrayed something 
in ourselves, or something higher than 
ourselves; the sensation of having sunk 
into a kind of mud, or of having soiled 
ourselves with something repugnant, the 
feeling if having done something that we 
must explain to someone who resides 
within or above us; accompanied by the 
feeling that the longer we continue to do 
it, the less convinced we feel of our 
cause. This represents a state of profound 
existential pain, it is the contact with 
what philosophers cal1 nothingness. And 
on the other hand, we are al1 familiar 
with the exaltation we feel when we 
choose something that brings us no visi- 
ble benefit, but which we are sure is in 
consonance with the demands that 
-through our conscience- the so-called 
universal moral order imposes on us. 
1 do not know whether these observations 
of mine will earn the applause of politi- 
cians. However, 1 have no option but to 
say what 1 think: to date my experience 
has convinced me that the best politics 
involves simply doing what our con- 
science tells us to. 
Esteemed audience, thank you for the at- 
tention with which you have listened to 
my views, and above al1 1 would like to 
thank Catalonia for the prize 1 have been 
awarded today. 1 am particularly happy 
to have received it together with a man 
whom 1 hold in the highest esteem. 
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EX-PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
hile it is an extraordinary 
honour for me to receive the 
Premi Internacional Catalunya 
1995, there are two reasons in particu- 
lar which lead me to accept it with spe- 
cial gratitude. 
The first has to do with the work carried 
out by the Institut Catalh de la Medi- 
terrhnia d'Estudis i Cooperació. 1 come 
from a country on the other side of the 
Alps, a continental country surrounded 
by nine neighbours, divided in two dur- 
ing the Cold War and currently one of the 
standard-bearers in the task of bridging 
the chasms between Eastern and Western 
Europe, of bringing together within 
Europe al1 the peoples that belong to her. 
Because of this we Germans are often re- 
proached for directing our attention more 
towards the East, and for ignoring the 
problems of Southern Europe. Perhaps 
this is true. Each nation has its priorities. 
But it is also necessary to recognize that 
the work of Europe as a whole forms an 
indivisible unit. When the order of the 
day places the problems of the Mediter- 
ranean on the agenda, this also affects 
the European interests of the Poles, 
Czechs and Germans, just as Spain, Italy 
or France may be affected by the suc- 
cesses or failures of European politics in 
the East. In the end we always reach the 
conclusion that al1 the peoples and cul- 
tures of Europe bear the stamp of Medi- 
terranean culture. 
We are indebted to the Athenian Solon 
for the first constitution of a democratic 
nature. He defined politics as the func- 
tion of balancing the disparate interests 
of the citizens, and pointed to ethics as 
an objective of the constitution. In this 
way he gave us the theme of our gather- 
ing here today: politics and ethics. 
Moreover, Solon declared himself, with 
admirable serenity, in favour of liberty: 
he decreed that no Athenian could be 
enslaved for his debts. That we still con- 
form to this precept today is demonstrat- 
ed by the fact that our governments are 
constantly increasing their debts and, for- 
tunately, they are still free from slavery. 
Catalonia is particularly qualified to 
help us Europeans become more involved 
with the roots of our civilisation. Its 
history and culture have given us great 
figures. Its geopolitical situation has giv- 
en it the need and, at the same time, the 
strength to make the encounter between 
different peoples and different cultures 
give rise to tolerance and enrichment 
rather than conflict. Every people must 
understand that their customs and cul- 
ture are not the only truth, and still less 
are they of divine order. At the same 
time, Catalonia, through its self-govern- 
ment, offers its citizens the solid roots 
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in their own country that each of us 
needs in this Europe that we are al1 
helping to form. 
Catalonia is also one of the most-exube- 
rant and successful regions of the Euro- 
pean Union. This sets up a dynamic of 
economic and productive development 
among regions that makes it possible for 
us to look to the future with confidence. 
For this reason, 1 would like to express 
my warmest gratitude to the citizens of 
Catalonia, to the members of the Gov- 
ernment of the Generalitat, to the Insti- 
tut Catali de la Mediterrinia d7Estudis i 
Cooperació, and to President Pujo1 for 
the great distinction which has been con- 
ferred on me. 
The second motive for my particular 
pleasure is that 1 am here today to receive 
the prize together with Václav Havel. 
1 have always considered him to be one 
of the spiritual and moral mentors of Eu- 
rope, and a friend, long before anybody 
suspected that he would one day be Pres- 
ident of his country. And to this day, he 
has remained loyal to his way of thinking 
and to his mission of refusing to surren- 
der until ethics once again becomes the 
recognizable and determining objective 
of politics. Later on 1 will return to this 
point. 
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Our theme today is "ethics and politics". 
As 1 have just mentioned, Solon made his 
pronouncements on this subject serenely, 
free from the myriad deceptions that 
mark our present-day conscience. 
Politics always implies dealing with in- 
terests. What is essential is to balance 
these interests internally in the fairest 
way possible and to promote them effi- 
ciently abroad. 
1s ethics the real objective of these inter- 
ests at present, as Solon believed it 
should be? My own definition would be 
more prudent. The person who defends 
his own interests without reference to a 
clear ethical foundation has a deficient 
understanding of these interests, and in 
the long term will end up prejudicing 
them. But the person who does not 
clearly relate ethics to these real and 
concrete interests is practising an evis- 
cerated politics which will eventually 
become an ineffectual and -who 
knows?- perhaps even dangerous ideol- 
ogy. We cannot separate politics from 
ethics, but neither can we separate eth- 
ics from politics. 
Democracy is not an educational institu- 
tion for the moral improvement of hu- 
manity. It contemplates us not as we 
should be ideally, but as we are in real- 
ity. It provides the rules of the game 
which we must use to settle our conflicts 
and harmonize our selfish interests with- 
in the context of freedom. The image that 
democracy has of us as persons, citizens 
and electors is entirely free from ideali- 
zation. The optimism of the Enlighten- 
ment, which proclaimed the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution of 
the United States with grand and noble 
words, has a somewhat pathetic ring to 
our present-day ears. 
Generally, politicians are not a different 
class of person from those who have cho- 
sen them for this role through election. 
Many of the disappointments which peo- 
ple have recently experienced regarding 
their politicians in al1 democracies have 
their origin in the observation that elec- 
tors and politicians are of the same class; 
that is, that they are equal. 
The same human frailties are being de- 
nounced everywhere. The political world 
is fraught with problems of al1 kinds, 
with nepotism and favouritism. Political 
power is used for personal gain. Cases of 
corruption inflame the spirit of the peo- 
ple. The more the actions of politicians 
diverge from their earlier promises, the 
more their credibility is reduced. 
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Al1 of these are, as we have said, merely 
complaints about well-known human 
weaknesses that are not only circum- 
scribed to politicians. However, neither will 
a general anthropology of egoism and the 
ease of seduction lead us anywhere. We 
are much more concerned with the ques- 
tion of the dangers inherent in and the 
possibilities offered by the democratic 
structure, and with the role which 
personal example can play in the ethical 
consolidation of politics. 
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1 would like to mention one structural 
danger: the tendency to constantly focus 
on the present to the detriment of the fu- 
ture. It is a legitimate leitmotif of the rep- 
resentative democracies that they con- 
cede political power for only a limited 
period, that is, until the following elec- 
tions. But this also has is consequences. 
The government is in power today, and 
the opposition wants to gain power to- 
monow. In the eyes of the government, 
therefore, the present carries more 
weight than the future. The prolongation 
of the present becomes the dominant 
theme for that government. Who is ca- 
pable, in such a situation, of taking a re- 
sponsible decision for the future, if this 
decision implies renouncing the sacred 
customs of the present, and may even en- 
danger their chances of re-election? The 
worrying evolution of the Earth's cli- 
matic conditions and the ever-increasing 
squandering of energy in industrial so- 
cieties are two classic examples of this 
phenomenon. The defined period of po- 
litical power with democratic legislation 
is fixed and limited by the election dates. 
If the great problems of our time do not 
wish to adapt to this calendar, too bad for 
them! 
IV 
Enough complaints about the weaknesses 
of power in democracy! Our interest 
should not lie in directionless utopian 
politics, but in the greater discipline of 
power. This is found in the competition 
between parties, in the control exercised 
by the media and in power sharing, al1 
within the context of public liberty. This 
liberty not only ensures the domestica- 
tion of power, but also offers us the pos- 
sibility of an approach to the truth. 
Scientific progress is based on free and 
public verification. In politics, decisions 
are taken by majority, but as we al1 know, 
majority is not a synonym for truth. 
Political liberty, however, does not mean 
giving up the search for truth. It only pre- 
supposes one thing: our common expe- 
rience and the conviction that we are 
faced with a truth that everyone seeks to 
reach without trying to claim it as their 
own. It can never be solely my truth, but 
by exchanging ideas and reasoning pub- 
licly and freely with others, 1 can un- 
derstand it a little better than 1 can 
alone. 1 am also beginning to realise that, 
in politics, it is a question not of pursuing 
the absolute truth but rather of finding 
the correct solution in each case; or, in 
still more cautious terms, the solution 
which is most correct in that it is the 
least erroneous. The first winner of the 
Premi Internacional Catalunya, Karl Pop- 
per, said, "Instead of demanding the 
greatest happiness for the greatest possi- 
ble number of people, it is necessary 
-with greater modesty- to demand the 
least degree of suffering for all". 
It is true that there is no guarantee that 
democracy may one day approach the 
apogee in this sense. One King Solomon 
can be more just than three of our inde- 
pendent courts; an enlightened absolutist 
leader can be wiser than an elected 
prime minister who is subject to control. 
And this in spite of the fact that the pre- 
cept of the Mediterranean philosopher 
EDICIO DE LES CONSTlTUClONS I ALTRES DRETS DE 
CATALUNYA 11495). ARCHIVES OF THE CROWN OF 
ARAGON. 
Plato, who said that politicians should be 
philosophers and a philosopher can be- 
come king, has not been put into practice 
very frequently in the course of history, 
and we can say with even greater confi- 
dence that this precept has definitely 
never met with convincing success. Be- 
cause in such a system freedom would be 
lacking, and truth cannot exist without 
freedom. Truth exists in a lasting way 
only in the space created by freedom. 
The greatest opportunity of al1 those af- 
forded us by freedom as a constitutional 
concept is the capacity for self-correction 
and peaceful change. This is its principle 
ethical force. Scandals, corruption and 
turbulent incidents are always due to hu- 
man weakness. They are not engendered 
by democracy and freedom, which, on 
the contrary, struggle to unmask them, 
while any other form of government 
would hide them. And for this selfsame 
reason, our form of government is better 
than any other. 
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At this point 1 would like to talk to you, 
above all, about the essential role of per- 
sonal example in political ethics, using 
some concrete examples that are espe- 
cially close to us at this time. These days, 
in Europe, we are recalling the end of the 
Second World War, fifty years ago. At 
that time, what was the ethical concept 
that accompanied the opening of the new 
era of peace? History reveals that on the 
conclusion of a war, the victors' attitudes 
may take one of many possible forms. 
Specifically, at the end of the First World 
War in 1919, the victors signed the Trea- 
ty of Versailles with Germany, the de- 
feated country. John M.Keynes, one of the 
men who participated in the negotiation 
on the British side and who is probably 
one of the most important economists of 
our time, defined the event in the follow- 
ing terms: "The personalities present in 
Paris were: Clemenceau, the most noble 
aesthetically; the President (Wilson), the 
most morally admirable; Lloyd George, 
the most subtle intellectually. The treaty 
was born of their differences and weak- 
nesses, heir to al1 the defects of its par- 
ents, without a hint of nobility, morality 
or intelligence". 
The consequences were fatal. Gennany, 
which had lost the war, did not suddenly 
cease being indispensable to European 
stability. However, as a result of the sys- 
tem established at Versailles, it was mo- 
rally and politically excluded from Eu- 
rope. Obviously this did not engender 
Nazism, but it favoured it, while helping 
to open the way to the Second World War 
and al1 its horrors. 
We can see, however, that the attitude of 
the United States of America, the most 
important victorious force, was very dif- 
ferent at the end of the Second World 
war. This time political interests went 
hand-in-hand with the ethical base, fol- 
lowing the classical model; 1 am refer- 
ring to the Marshall Plan. Europe had 
been left half-destroyed and completely 
exhausted. At that moment, the Ameri- 
cans helped us, with decisive material 
contributions, to recover our own politi- 
cal responsibility. Their plan was a gen- 
erous one with a broad outlook. It in- 
cluded us all, al1 the defeated arrnies, and 
it did not create obstacles or impose con- 
ditions. Rather than leading to renewed 
campaigns for vengeance, it created new 
alliances. Its objective was truth in poli- 
tics, that is to day, reconciliation and 
peace. And this is my motto in these days 
of the commemoration of the past. 
This also our main concern, both within 
our own country and in our relations with 
neighbouring countries. Today, as a re- 
sult of the reunification of Germany, we 
have problems with the behaviour of the 
people who had to live under the dicta- 
torship of a single party, who were sub- 
ject to the whole system of espionage 
and discipline carried out by the famous 
Stasi (State Security). This system has 
caused serious moral damage to the pop- 
ulation. It has given rise to al1 kinds of 
temptations and corruption, it has des- 
troyed confidence between neighbours 
and has poisoned the climate of peaceful 
coexistente. If we wish to put a stop to 
this poisoning of the atmosphere, we will 
have to face the truth. 
There are very few possibilities for 
achieving peace and reconciliation 
among men if truth is ignored. But, on 
the other hand, without this objectiire of 
reconciliation, truth is inhuman. 
Whoever has committed a crime needs to 
reflect on their weaknesses, their betray- 
als and their guilt. Public accusations are 
not specifically necessary; what is nec- 
essary is the interior face of intimate re- 
flection, which can work miracles and 
offer the opportunity of a new life. Who- 
ever has been the victim of a crime, on 
the other hand, has to be capable of mak- 
ing an immense effort to restructure the 
relationship that the criminal action has 
destroyed. He or she must be ready to 
forgive. And this attitude is just as diffi- 
cult -o r  even more so- to achieve than 
the other, than repentance. Because the 
person who forgives cannot impose any 
moral superiority on the guilty party. He 
or she must, of necessity, recognize the 
humanity of the latter, because it is in re- 
ality nothing other than his or her own 
humanity. 
Perhaps you are asking yourselves what 
relation al1 these human experiences have 
with politics? We live in secular and 
ideologically neutral states. That great 
Christian prayer, the Lord's Prayer, with 
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its supplication for forgiveness that says 
"as we forgive them who sin against us", 
is not one of the articles of our constitu- 
tions, nor is it one of the principles of in- 
temational law. 
Of course not ... But these beliefs are, 
nonetheless, deep human experiences 
that can frequently help us overcome 
dangerous political obstacles; just be- 
cause they are dogmas of faith does not 
mean that they are false or irrelevant. Eth- 
ics, without which politics cannot de- 
velop, lies in the behaviour of persons 
rather than in the articles of the law. The 
force of personal example is irreplace- 
able. 1 wish to cite only one example, that 
of Václav Havel, who defines the spe- 
cific community composed of Czechs, 
Germans and Jews as the real subject of 
the history of Bohemia, and at the same 
time declares himself an enemy of the 
monopoly of the past by ancient national 
causes. He speaks clearly and calls things 
by their real names: Hitler's invasion, the 
massacres of innocent victims, but also 
the expulsion of the Germans from the 
Sudetenland. Havel has repeatedly op- 
posed any attempt to create a balance 
sheet of crimes, any comparison between 
the demands of one group and another, 
the vicious circle of constant vengeance 
and reprisals. Because he deeply feels the 
elemental need to overcome the obstacles 
standing in the way of good relationships 
between neighbours who have shared 
borders for a long time. he proposes a 
new and real dialogue, a dialogue in 
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which no-one should feel hostage to their 
fellows, nor to a pernicious history. 
However, we have not yet reached this 
objective. But we have taken the first 
steps along the road, and we are striving, 
al1 together, to achieve this goal. The per- 
sonal example of one man has made this 
possible. His politics are born of his eth- 
ics. And thanks to these ethics, he has 
managed to discern the needs of his 
country and to make use of them. He has 
understood history sufficiently well to 
keep the past from repeating itself in the 
programmes of the present. He looks to- 
wards the future of a Europe whose spir- 
itual development is rooted in the Med- 
iterranean, and which is at present 
flowering here in Catalonia. 
Mediterranean civilisation.does not make 
men into angels. It sees in politics the 
need to balance frequently antagonistic 
interests. But it also knows, from expe- 
rience, that it can only achieve this 
through ethics. 
